Recent research suggests that loss framed contracts are an effective instrument for principals to maximize the effort of their agents. Framing effects arise from defining thresholds that vary the salience of losses and gains while preserving payoff equivalence of the underlying contract. While under Prospect Theory a loss frame should lead to more effort we show that contract thresholds also exert a suggestive effect on performance that can trump the impact of loss aversion. Loss framing therefore carries a risk. As agents focus their effort choice on the expressed thresholds, poorly selected thresholds reduce effort and the principal might prefer offering a contract that does not impose a threshold at all. On the other hand, imposing demanding thresholds may push effort beyond levels predicted by Prospect Theory.
Introduction
A central tenet of Prospect Theory asserts that 'losses loom larger than gains,' that is, individuals have a preference for avoiding losses over acquiring gains-a concept commonly referred to as loss aversion (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979) . Hence framing a transaction in terms of a loss will tend to provoke a stronger response than an economically equivalent transaction framed in terms of a gain. Exploiting this insight, researchers have recently turned their attention to the framing of contracts. By establishing thresholds in contracts around which earnings are presented as losses or gains, researchers have found that individuals (Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2011; Armentier and Boly, 2012) and teams (Hossain and List, 2012) exert greater effort under loss-framed contracts than under payoff-equivalent contracts framed in terms of gains.
However, rather than merely serving as a pivot to frame a loss or gain, contract thresholds may also have a suggestive effect, e.g. by communicating expectations of performance. Based on this idea, we propose a new account of how thresholds influence the effort parties invest under loss framed contracts. Apart from the role they play in establishing incentives and triggering loss aversion, we argue that thresholds exert a suggestive effect that influences behavior.
To test this theory we conducted an online experiment involving real effort. Participants were presented with a screen containing a table with 200 digits between 1 and 9. They were tasked with counting the number of times the digit "1" appeared in the table. After entering the correct number, participants were shown a new screen, with a different table of digits, and could then decide whether to continue or stop the task. Participants earned 1 Euro for every completed screen. The characterization of their earnings profile, however, was varied across four treatment conditions. The first condition offered participants a "plain-vanilla" bonus contract, which promised participants 1 per completed screen. The contract did not prescribe any target quantity, unlike the three other treatments, which offered contracts with expressed thresholds-5, 15, or 50 screens, each associated with earnings of 5, 15, and 50 Euros, respectively. We label the easy-to-meet expressed threshold (i.e., 5 screens) the "lowbar" contract, the more demanding intermediate threshold (of 15) the "stretching" contract and the highest threshold (i.e., 50) the "extreme-effort" contract. 1 Under each of these three contracts, participants earned a bonus of one additional Euro for each screen they completed beyond the stipulated threshold and they faced a penalty of one Euro per screen below the stipulated threshold. In other words, under all four contracts that constitute our treatment conditions, participants were offered exactly the same payoffs, namely 1 Euro per completed screen.
To illustrate, assume that a participant completes 12 screens. Then under the plainvanilla contract he gets 12 (12 x 1). Under the contract with the threshold of 5 he gets 5 plus a bonus of 7. Under the contract with threshold 15 he gets 15 minus a penalty of 3. Under the contract stipulating threshold 50 he gets 50 minus a penalty of 38. At every level of performance, participants receive exactly the same payoff under each contract. They face the same linear incentive scheme in each condition; only the framing of the contract differs.
The basic results of the experiment indicate that the stretching contract is associated with a greater mean effort level than the plain-vanilla contract, which itself performs better than the low-bar and extreme-effort contracts. This suggests that a mechanism distinct from loss aversion is at work. Prospect Theory predicts that compared to the plain-vanilla contract, the three threshold contracts should each lead to greater mean effort levels, even if they only marginally trigger loss aversion. Our results are at odds with these predictions but consistent with our account that stipulated thresholds also have a suggestive effect on
behavior.
An implication of these findings is that a principal seeking to maximize agents' effort levels should offer them a somewhat demanding stretching contract. Principals face some risks, however, when turning to stretching contracts. If the principal misses the mark and expresses a threshold that is either trivially achieved (low-bar) or too demanding to meet (extremeeffort) then he can expect his agent to exert considerably less effort than he could have under a plain-vanilla contract. Hence, loss-framing is not a riskless strategy for principals. When the principal lacks good information about agents' production functions, the best strategy may be to play it safe and offer a linear contract without expressing thresholds.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design and the procedure of the experiment. Section 3 lays out the predictions entailed by Prospect Theory and the alternative predictions we hypothesize. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The study investigates the effect of using different quantity and quality thresholds in contracts on the mean effort level of agents. Participants had the opportunity to enter into a contract with the experimenter to perform a real effort task in exchange for money. After being presented with the contract terms, participants could decide whether they wanted to accept or reject the contract. Before making their choice participants were informed that they were about to conclude a valid contract governed by the German Civic Code (BGB).
If participants decided to reject the contract they received no payment based on the real effort and were immediately directed to the second stage of the experiment where they and all other participants were asked to complete a series of incentivized economic and psychological tests (see more details below). If they accepted the contract, the real effort task was presented to them and the main experiment began.
The task consisted of counting all "1" digits in a table containing 200 figures between 1 and 9. Given that the task did not require any special skills, we assume that performance was a function only of effort (see Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Hoffman, 2011 ). An answer was considered correct if it fell within a range of +2/-2 of the true value. (For example, if the 2 Our observations are nicely summarized in Voltaire's comment that perfection is the enemy of the good ("Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien"). correct number of "1" digits was 42 while the participant counted 40, the result was treated as correct.) If participants gave an answer outside of this tolerated margin they could retry counting the table as often as they wished. They were required to make some screen input at least every three minutes; failure to do so would terminate the experiment. After each successfully completed screen, participants were asked whether they wanted to continue on to the next screen. If they decided to go on, a new table was displayed; if they chose to stop, they were directed to the incentivized economic and psychological tests.
As described above, we implemented four treatment conditions. The baseline treatment was a plain-vanilla contract with no expressed threshold, which simply offered 1 for each successfully completed screen. This exact linear payment scheme was preserved in the three additional treatments, which each included a threshold: the low-bar contract stipulated a 5 screen threshold, the stretching contract stipulated 15 screens and the extreme-effort contract expressed a threshold of 50 screens. We conducted the plain-vanilla treatment first and found that participants completed an average of 10.4 screens. We used this data to calibrate the thresholds of the other contracts. The low-bar threshold (5 screens) was set clearly below the mean effort participants exerted in the plain-vanilla treatment where no threshold was present. The stretching contract (with a 15 screen threshold) obliged participants to increase their efforts by nearly 50% in comparison to the average performance in the absence of an expressed threshold. The extreme-effort threshold (50 screens) was set at a seemingly unreasonable level, demanding around 5 times the mean performance observed under the plain-vanilla treatment; further it required notably more than what would usually be expected in online experiments. Participants' exerted effort under the different treatments was evaluated along two dimensions: quantity and quality. Quantity is measured simply by the number of successfully completed screens. Quality of performance is determined by the accuracy with which partic-ipants completed the task. We recorded each count that participants entered and calculated by how many screens they deviated from the true answer. We considered both, miscounted trials, which participants had to repeat and those counts that were treated as correct because they were within the range of defined error tolerance (+/-2).
In addition to effort measures, we also elicited participants' willingness to enter into the contract. The efficiency of a particular contract depends not only on how people perform under its terms, but also on how likely they are to agree to incur the contractual obligation in the first place. As contract law requires in order to make contracts legally enforceable, but unlike in most other experiments, participants were free to accept or reject the contract offers. 4 This real contract setting also allows us to study the impact of different terms on acceptance rates. If rates differ, it follows that participants are more willing to accept some terms than others, which is relevant for a principal who wants to reduce the likelihood that offers are rejected.
The experiment was conducted online using the server of the Max Planck Institute of Economics. We decided to conduct the experiment online because we wanted participants to have real opportunity costs when deciding whether to continue with the task. We measure effort by eliciting the point where participants prefer some other activity over continuing with the experiment. In a laboratory setting, participants have little opportunity costs since they cannot leave until the session is over. By contrast, at home, participants can easily stop and pick up a preferred activity. Even if we conducted individual sessions, coming to the laboratory causes sunk costs that make participants less likely to reject a contract without earning a payment they consider as an adequate compensation for their participation.
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All participants were students of the University of Münster, Germany, with various majors; 90% of them had not participated in an economic experiment before. Participants were 4 Most of the literature does not endogenize the acceptance decision but assumes that participants have entered into a contract under given terms (see, e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007) . In our design we want to account for the possibility that behavior changes depending on whether parties explicitly assent to the contract.?
5 Show-up fees in Lab experiments can mitigate this problem but can never be tailored to the invividual participant.
sent an invitation by e-mail via the mail-server of the university. The E-mail did not describe the purpose of the study in order to avoid participants self-selecting in an experiment they were interested in. The invitation contained a link that directed participants to the website of the experiment. It was active only for a single login. Participants had to complete the stages of the experiment within strict time limits and were kept informed of this fact with constant screen messages. If participants logged out or did not finish stages within these time limits, the experiment was automatically aborted and participants were notified that they were excluded from the experiment. We set those time limits to force participants to focus on the task and block internet distractions that can easily distort results of online studies. Participants were informed up-front about the amount of time they would need to complete the whole study thereby reducing the likelihood that participants would have to break off the experiment because they ran out of time. The online instructions received by participants are reproduced in Appendix B. The real effort experiment was followed by two psychometric tests. The first, a cognitive reflection test, measures participant's impulsiveness (CRT, see Frederick, 2005) . The test consists of a set of three questions, which participants have a total of 90 seconds to complete.
Questions are designed such that participants' initial impulses lead them to an incorrect answer. 7 The test therefore measures the participants' ability to think beyond their initial impulse and reach the correct but counter-intuitive answer.
The second test measures loss aversion by giving the participants an opportunity to participate in two lotteries. 8 The first lottery presents participants with a 1/2 probability of winning 8 and a 1/2 probability of loosing 5. The second lottery has the same payoffs, but is repeated six times and thus lowers the probability of suffering an overall loss. An unbiased participant should play both lotteries, since participating yields a gain in expectations. We 6 We confirmed that participants could understand the instructions by posing control questions in an offline pilot session. Participants had no difficulties in correctly calculating their earnings based on the different contract terms. We programmed the experiment using the open-source survey application LimeSurvey. See http://www.limesurvey.org/.
7 The first question is: "A bat and a ball cost  1.10 in total. The bat costs  1 more than the ball. How many Cents does the ball cost?" Ten Cents! is peoples impulsive answer. 8 The test was developed and used by Goette, Hoffman, and Fehr (2004). classify participants into two different categories: 1) The "loss averse" type who rejects at least one of the lotteries, 2) and the unbiased "rational" type who participates in both lotteries.
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All aspects of the experiment, including the follow-up behavioral tests, were incentivized and payoffs depended on the participants own decisions. When calibrating the payoffs we made sure that participants could expect to earn slightly more than in a regular student job in and outside of the university in order to make incentives comparable to a normal working environment. A student job in Münster would offer approximately 8 for an hour.
In our real effort task participants need less than one minute to count a table and move to the next screen. They could read the instructions in 5 minutes which leaves them with an hourly wage of 55. Since only every 5th participant was randomly selected for payment participants expect to earn 11. In expectation, our participants therefore earn 1/3 more than in a regular student job.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
The effectiveness of contract framing is usually explained by appeal to Prospect Theory's concept of loss aversion (Hossain and List, 2012, Armentier and Boly, 2012) . According to Prospect Theory, all three threshold contracts should increase observed effort compared to the plain-vanilla contract, because they express a threshold that frames performance levels below it as losses, while the plain-vanilla contract frames such performance levels as neutral accomplishments or gains.
We expect that an additional mechanism is at work: one where contract thresholds have a suggestive effect (e.g. communicating expectations) with which parties tend to comply.
Therefore, we predict that the low-bar threshold will drag down effort levels, as it was set at a fraction of the plain-vanilla mean effort level and we assume that participants seek to comply 9 It has become common in the literature to refer to the unbiased type as the "rational" type. 10 Stochastic payouts are routinely used in experimental economics as there is evidence that paying out larger amounts at a lower probability simulates high stakes: that is, incentives for participants are stronger than in the case where they are paid smaller amounts at a higher probability, even though expected payoffs are equivalent (Laury, 2006; Laury and Holt, 2008). with reasonable thresholds. Under the stretching condition, which sets the threshold roughly 50% above the plain-vanilla mean effort level our theory predicts a pull-up effect leading to an increase of mean effort. In the low-bar condition the two effects are countervailing.
Assuming we have set the threshold low enough, we expect the drag-down effect to trump the positive effect predicted by Prospect Theory. 11 In the stretching condition both theories predict an increase in effort levels. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 In the low-bar treatment, mean effort is lower than under the plain vanilla contract. In the stretching treatment, mean effort is higher than under the plain-vanilla contract.
For the extreme-effort treatment Prospect Theory predicts lower effort levels than for contracts which impose reasonable thresholds. This is because an agent's value function is commonly assumed to be convex in the losses, that is, losses which are more distant from an agent's reference point carry less weight and the agent will invest less effort to avoid them.
Moreover, too extreme thresholds might even fail to establish a loss frame as agents may not take them seriously. As the plain-vanilla contract sets no loss frame at all, Prospect
Theory would therefore predict effort under the extreme-effort condition to be closer to (but not below) the mean effort level under the plain-vanilla contract. We arrive at the same prediction under our theory. By pushing the threshold too far beyond reasonable demands the extreme-effort contract is likely to undermine the suggestive force of the threshold. Again, we would expect agents to chose effort levels closer to (but not below) those observed under the plain-vanilla contract, which cannot have suggestive influence over effort levels as it expresses no threshold at all. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 In the extreme-effort condition, the mean effort level decreases relative to the stretching condition (H2.1), but mean effort should not fall below the level observed in the plain-vanilla contract (H2.2). 
Results

Treatment Effect on Quantity
We first present how participants' mean effort levels differed across treatments (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). Observe that the plain-vanilla contract, which does not express a quality threshold, leads to a mean effort level of 10.4 screens, the low-bar contract (with expressed quantity 5) leads to a mean effort level of 6.2 screens, and the stretching contract (with expressed quantity of 15) leads to a mean effort of 14.3 screens. These differences are statistically significant at well below the 1% level, supporting Hypothesis 1 (Mann-Whitney test, see Table 1 for Z and p values).
Table 1 also shows that the extreme-effort contract (with expressed quantity of 50) leads to mean effort of 8.4. This is below the mean effort level under the stretching contract. The difference is significant at the 1% level, supporting Hypothesis 2.1 (Mann-Whitney test, see Table 1 for Z and p values). Moreover, though, mean effort in the extreme-effort condition even falls below the level observed in the plain-vanilla condition. This effect is significant at well below the 5% level, contradicting Hypothesis 2.2. The finding that the extreme-effort threshold has a negative impact on effort is predicted neither by Prospect Theory nor by 
extreme-effort 50 8.4 (N=39) -our expressed threshold effect, and suggests that the extreme-effort threshold may lead to negative reciprocity or may crowd out the intrinsic motivation of participants.
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Considering only those participants who accepted the contract reflects the perspective of a principal who faces an unlimited supply of labor but does not care how many potential workers are turned off by the terms of a particular contract. There are, however, situations where a principal wants to increase the mean effort level of a fixed group of people. Then, participants rejecting the proposed contract impose a cost on the principal. We incorporate this scenario in our analysis by treating all participants who reject the contract as exerting zero effort and find that our qualitative results are unchanged (See Table 5 in Appendix A).
As for the mechanism driving the effect, we assumed that the suggestive effect of the expressed threshold is due to the inability of participants to question the stipulated threshold.
If this explanation is correct, we would not expect all participants to react the threshold's suggestive force in the same way. Participants with low scores on the cognitive reflection test would be more likely to match the threshold than participants with high scores. Table   3 compares the frequency with which low (0-1 correct answers) and high (2-3) CRT types exactly match the threshold in our three treatments. For the stretching contract, we observe that 27% of the low CRT types exactly meet the threshold, while none of the high types matches it. The difference is highly significant (twosided Fisher exact test, p0.01). For the low-bar treatment we observe the same pattern though the effect is not significant for the two-sided Fisher exact test (p=0.13). By contrast, the results for the extreme-effort treatment suggests that the unreasonable threshold is easier to ignore, as neither high nor low CRT types matched the threshold.
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Finally, we assume that both effects (loss aversion and the suggestive effect of the expressed threshold) influence participants' effort choices. The two effects countervail each other in the low-bar treatment while they go in the same direction in the stretching condition. If both effects are indeed operative we would therefore expect for the low-bar treatment that the drag-down effect relative to the plain vanilla condition should be smaller for loss averse participants than for rational participants. This is because the positive effect of loss aversion should (at least partly) offset the negative direction of the expressed threshold effect, and more so for loss averse types than for their rational counterparts. By contrast, we would expect for the stretching treatment that the pull-up effect relative to the plain vanilla condition should be larger for loss averse participants than for rational participants, since the positive effect of loss aversion piles up on the positive direction of the expressed 13 The reported results are robust to different coding where we define high CRT types as those participants with 1-3 correct answers (see Table 6 in Appendix A). threshold effect. 11.5 (N=26) 5.5 (N=27) 12.2 (N=24) 9.5 (N=22) Diff -6.0 +0.7 -2.0
Loss Averse (N=151) 9.7 (N=36) 6.9 (N=35) 16.2 (N=40) 7.9 (N=40) Diff -2.8 +6.5 -1.8
Mann-Whitney
p<0.01 p=0.50
In Table 3 , we compare rational to loss averse participants and observe that indeed the mean drag-down effect in the low-bar treatment is smaller for loss averse participants (2.8 screens) than for rational participants (6.0 screens), and the average pull-up under the stretching contract is 6.5 screens for loss averse participants and only 0.7 screens for rational participants. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test, p0.01).
Our results lead to an interesting conclusion: A principal may induce his agent to exert higher effort than he otherwise would have by writing a stretching contract. However, in so doing, he runs the risk of setting a threshold which is either too low or too high, thereby inducing his agent to exert even less effort than he otherwise would have. Where a principal lacks precise knowledge about workers' abilities and available technology he may well be better off sticking with a plain vanilla contract without any stipulated threshold as a second best.
Quality and Contract Rejection Rates
In addition to effort measured in terms of quantity (that is, screens successfully completed),
we also explore quality effort (measured by the accuracy with which participants perform the counting task). One concern could be that quantity and quality may be in conflict. In other words, contracts leading to higher quantity might lead to lower quality (lower accuracy of performance). In our experiment we can distinguish two cases of inaccuracy. The first case of error occurs if a participant's answer deviates from the true value by a margin of less or equal to +/-2. In this case, he can proceed to the next screen. In the second case, the participant's answer falls outside the +/-2 margin of error, which forces the participant to recount the table if he wants to proceed to the next screen. We form an inaccuracy score for each participant by adding up the deviations in both successful and failed attempts and dividing them by the number of successfully completed screens. Table 4 presents how the mean inaccuracy score differs across treatments. We find that effort quality is the lowest under the extreme-effort contract, closely followed by the low-bar contract, with mean inaccuracy scores of 0.76 and 0.71, respectively.
Participants are significantly more accurate under both the plain-vanilla contract (0.45) and the stretching contract (0.39). The differences are statistically significant at to below the 5% level (Mann-Whitney test). 14 Moreover, comparing Tables 1 and 4 , we observe that the plain-vanilla and stretching contracts induce higher effort levels than the low-bar and the extreme-effort contract along both the quantity and the quality dimension. The positive relationship between quality and quantity is significant (Spearman rank correlation, rho=-0.14, p=0.05). 15 This finding seems to run counter the intuition of the multitasking model 14 Participants under the plain-vanilla treatment make fewer mistakes than under the extreme-effort treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.01) and the low-bar treatment (p=0.02). The same holds true when comparing the stretching contract to the extreme-effort (p0.01) and the low-bar condition (p0.01). 15 Note that our quality measure is an inaccuracy score. Therefore a negative value for Spearman's rho (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) , which would predict that stronger incentives to increase quantity lead to more shirking on the quality dimension. An account consistent with our results might be that contracts which motivate participants more make them exert more effort on both the quality and the quantity dimension of effort.
16 Table 4 also reports the contract rejection rates for the different treatments. We find that the extreme-effort contract leads to a significantly higher rejection rate (37.1%) than all other contracts. Rejection rates under the stretching (16.9%) and the low-bar contract (19.4%) do not differ statistically from those under the plain-vanilla contract (19.4%).
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This result cannot be explained by Prospect theory, which would suggest that, if the loss frame has an impact on the contract rejection rate, the rate should increase as the stipulated threshold increases. 18 However, the result is consistent with the idea that participants do not want to enter into contracts which they find unreasonable and/or have no intention to honor. This would lead to high rejection rates under the extreme-effort condition but not under the low-bar and the stretching treatment, where participants, at least when they read the terms, are more likely to think that they may want to fulfill the contract.
Conclusion
Prospect Theory suggests that loss framing should lead people to exert greater effort. We show that the implication is not so simple. When thresholds are used to trigger loss aversion, contract framing entails a risk. In this paper we demonstrate that people tend to meet implies a positive relationship between quanity and quality. The number of observations is 193. Linear regression result (Coef=-3.04, p0.01). 16 However, our design is not well suited to test the multi-tasking theory. While participants might be able to save time by lowering the accuracy with which the task is performed, the opposite might also be true. Lowering the accuracy will increase the probability of having to recount screens as answers might fall outside the margin of error especially if participants cannot perfectly control their level of accuracy. 17 The two-sided Fisher exact test is significant at the 5% level for the difference between the extremeeffort contract and all the other contracts (050: p0.05; 550: p0.05; 1550: p=0.02). The test is highly insignificant for the difference between the other contracts (05: p=1.00; 015: p=0.82, 515: p=0.82).
18 Luft (1994) finds that people avoid loss framed or penalty contracts and prefer identical bonus terms if they have a choice. Theoretically, the prediction might not hold for extreme-effort contracts because of the notion of deminishing sensitivity, but it should definitely hold when going from the low-bar to the stretching condition.
expressed thresholds around which earnings are framed as losses or gains. The suggestive effect of the expressed thresholds can trump the impact of loss aversion. By stipulating a demanding but reasonable stretching threshold, a principal can maximize the mean effort of his employees. However, demanding too little may dampen the effort level compared to the expected performance under a simple contract that does not impose a threshold. In addition a threshold pushed too high can similarly depress effort: An extreme loss frame may undermine intrinsic motivation or otherwise reduce effort compared to a contract without a frame. This risk of contract framing is not marginal. The optimal stretching threshold will depend on the production function of the agent. But this information is often private and unobservable. Unless the principal has nuanced information about his agent's abilities and available technology a second-best plain-vanilla contract will often be a better choice. As Voltaire said, perfection is the enemy of the good. 
